Approved For Release 2006/04/21

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MENORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Intentions

1. General.

the USSR has gradually stepped up and expanded its diplomatic, political, and economic offensive against the Nest and the cold war has now reached another peak of aggressiveness and militancy. In its current offensive, the USSR has not changed its previous tactics of subversion, violence, and diplomatic and propaganda pressure; the improved Soviet power position, however, enables the USSR to conduct its offensive on more fronts simultaneously and to adopt a more defiant and militant stand. The Kremlin is presumably confident that the West will not react with enough vigor to create conditions which might lead to actual hostilities.

Draft of ORE 35-50 (In process of IAC Coordination): "A deliberate Soviet decision to resort to direct military action before July 1952 is improbable. Nevertheless, the conduct of Soviet foreign policy will continue to be aggressive at every point of contact with the Western world. In this circumstance there is always a real possibility of an unintentional outbreak of hostilities due to miscalculation either by the USSR or the Western alliance of one another's motives or intentions.

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Korea in the spring of 1949 would probably in time be followed by an invasion, timed to coincide with Communist-led South Korean revolts, by the North Korean People's Army. Assuming that Korean Communists would make aggressive use of the opportunity presented them, US troop withdrawal would probably result in a collapse of the US-supported

Republic of Korea. In contrast, continued presence in Korea of a moderate US force, would not only discourage the threatened invasion but would assist in sustaining the will and ability of the Koreans

themselves to resist any future invasion.

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forces are still being expended. So far as the ground forces are concerned, this process involves the integration into the "People's Army" of local recruits and of Korean troops that have seen service under the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, as well as the equipping of this force with small arms, artillery, vehicles, aircraft, and armor from the USSR.

"People's Army" are being deployed southward in the area of the Jith Parallel. "People's Army" and Border Constabulary units there equal or surpass the strength of southern Korean army units similarly deployed. Tanks and heavy artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent months.

The ultimate local objective of the Soviet Union and of the northern Koreen regime is the elimination of the sections Republic of Koree and the unification of the Koreen peninsula under Communist domination. To this end, an open invasion of the Republic by northern Korean military forces has thus far been delayed in favor of a coordinated compaign involving political pressure within southern Korea, subversion, pressured, intimidation, seconomic pressure, and military actions by infiltration of guerrilla forces.



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